A Theory of Legal Obligation
A Theory of Legal Obligation
The focus of this monograph lies in the construction of a theory of legal obligation, understanding it as a discrete notion with its own defining traits. In this work, Bertea specifically addresses the question: how should legal obligation be distinctively conceptualized? The conceptualization of legal obligation he defends in this work gradually emerges from a critical assessment of the theories of legal obligation that have been most influential in the contemporary legal-theoretical debate. Building on such critical analysis, Bertea's study purports to offer a novel and unconventional conceptualization of legal obligation, which is characterized as a law-engendered intersubjective reason for carrying out certain courses of conduct.
- Questions how should legal obligation be distinctively conceptualized and defends a comprehensive and original theory of legal obligation
- Critically assesses the most influential theoretical existing models and presents a new, alternative concept of legal obligation
- Explores a unique methodology of inquiry that has not been used in jurisprudence before and is not reducible to any of the traditional methods employed
Product details
September 2019Adobe eBook Reader
9781108682060
0 pages
This ISBN is for an eBook version which is distributed on our behalf by a third party.
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- 1. The concept of obligation
- 2. Contemporary approaches to legal obligations: a preliminary map
- 3. The social-practice account
- 4. The interpretivist account
- 5. The conventionalist reason account
- 6. The exclusionary reason account
- 7. A revisionary Kantian conception
- 8. Further dimensions of the revisionary Kantian conception
- 9. The robust reason account
- 10. The method of presuppositional interpretation
- Conclusion.
