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The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid

The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid

The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid

Bertin Martens, European Commission
Uwe Mummert, Max Planck Institute, Jena
Peter Murrell, University of Maryland, College Park
Paul Seabright, Université de Toulouse
Elinor Ostrom
June 2002
Available
Hardback
9780521808187

    This book analyzes the institutions--incentives and constraints--that guide the behavior of persons involved in the implementation of aid programs. While traditional performance studies tend to focus almost exclusively on policies and institutions in recipient countries, the authors look at incentives in the entire chain of organizations involved in the delivery of foreign aid, from donor governments and agencies to consultants, experts and other intermediaries. They examine incentives inside donor agencies, the interaction of subcontractors with recipient organizations, incentives inside recipient country institutions, and biases in aid performance monitoring systems.

    • New perspective on an old debate - why aid is often ineffective
    • Interesting combination of theory and practice
    • Innovative contribution to growing literature on new institutional economics, emphasizing performance problems inside the aid supply chain, rather than in the recipient countries

    Reviews & endorsements

    "The mjor merit of Martens' argument lies in his explicit plea in favor of the role evaluation pays in the information feedback loop by enlightening taxpayers about the `true` benefits of aid programs." Review of Political Economy, Mita Marra, Italian National Research Council

    See more reviews

    Product details

    June 2002
    Hardback
    9780521808187
    212 pages
    229 × 152 × 16 mm
    0.48kg
    15 b/w illus.
    Available

    Table of Contents

    • List of figures
    • Foreword Elinor Ostrom
    • 1. Introduction Bertin Martens
    • 2. Conflicts of objectives and task allocation in aid agencies Paul Seabright
    • 3. The interaction of donors, contractors and recipients in implementing aid for institutional reform Peter Murrell
    • 4. Embedding externally induced institutional reform Uwe Mummert
    • 5. The role of evaluation in foreign aid programmes Bertin Martens
    • 6. Some policy conclusions regarding organizations involved in foreign aid Bertin Martens
    • Index.
      Authors
    • Bertin Martens , European Commission

      Bertin Martens is an economist at the European Commission in Brussels. He has worked for various foreign aid organizations, including United Nations agencies and the European Commission, and he is a member of the International Society for New Institutional Economics.

    • Uwe Mummert , Max Planck Institute, Jena

      Professor Uwe Mummert is a researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems in Jena, Germany.

    • Peter Murrell , University of Maryland, College Park

      Peter Murrell is Professor of Economics at the University of Maryland and currently holds a Chair on the Academic Council of the IRIS Center. He is the author of The Nature of Socialist Economies and Assessing the Value of Law in the Transition to Socialism, and is a contributor to various journals, including the American Economic Review and the Journal of Comparative Economics.

    • Paul Seabright , Université de Toulouse

      Paul Seabright is Professor of Economics at the University of Toulouse. His many publications have focused on theoretical and applied microeconomics, and he is currently a Research Fellow at the Centre for Economic Policy Research.

    • Elinor Ostrom