Voting and Collective Decision-Making
Voting and Collective Decision-Making
Federico Valenciano, University of the Basque Country, Bilbao
Every day thousands of decisions are made by all kinds of committees, parliaments, councils and boards by a 'yes-no' voting process. Sometimes a committee can only accept or reject the proposals submitted to it for a decision. On other occasions, committee members have the possibility of modifying the proposal and bargaining an agreement prior to the vote. In either case, what rule should be used if each member acts on behalf of a different-sized group? It seems intuitively clear that if the groups are of different sizes then a symmetric rule (e.g. the simple majority or unanimity) is not suitable. The question then arises of what voting rule should be used. Voting and Collective Decision-Making addresses this and other issues through a study of the theory of bargaining and voting power, showing how it applies to real decision-making contexts.
- Case study of voting in the European Union shows how theory applies to real decision-making contexts
- End-of-chapter exercises allow readers to monitor their understanding of the material
- Meaning of formal statements and technical notation always explained in plain English, making the book suitable for readers from a wide variety of mathematical backgrounds
Reviews & endorsements
"[A]n important work."
Canadian Journal of Political Science, Peter John Loewen
Product details
February 2011Paperback
9780521182638
204 pages
229 × 152 × 11 mm
0.28kg
Available
Table of Contents
- List of figures
- Preface
- 1. Preliminaries
- 2. Seminal papers, seminal ambiguities
- 3. Take-it-or-leave-it committees
- 4. Bargaining committees
- 5. Application to the European Union
- Index.
