The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure
The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure
Brian Skyrms, author of the successful Evolution of the Social Contract (which won the prestigious Lakatos Award) has written a sequel. The book is a study of ideas of cooperation and collective action. The point of departure is a prototypical story found in Rousseau's A Discourse on Inequality. Rousseau contrasts the pay-off of hunting hare where the risk of non-cooperation is small but the reward is equally small, against the pay-off of hunting the stag where maximum cooperation is required but where the reward is so much greater. Thus, rational agents are pulled in one direction by considerations of risk and in another by considerations of mutual benefit. Written with Skyrms's characteristic clarity and verve, this intriguing book will be eagerly sought out by students and professionals in philosophy, political science, economics, sociology and evolutionary biology.
- Skyrms is a successful author with good track record (Evolution of the Social Contract)
- Earlier book sold widely across disciplines - so will this one
Reviews & endorsements
"Rousseau's story of a stag hunt illuminates his vision of the social contract. Brian Skyrms emulates the master by using the Stag Hunt Game to illustrate his very different vision. Who would have thought there was so much to learn from such a simple game?" Ken Binmore, California Institute of Technology
"dense but exciting...comrehensive and ambitious in scope...a treasure trove of interesting and intriguing results." - Times Literary Supplement
Product details
December 2003Hardback
9780521826518
166 pages
223 × 146 × 18 mm
0.313kg
Available
Table of Contents
- 1. The stag hunt
- Part I. Location:
- 2. Bargaining with neighbors
- 3. Stag hunt with neighbors
- Part II. Signals:
- 4. Evolution of inference
- 5. Cheap talk
- Part III. Association:
- 6. Choosing partners
- 7. Coevolution of structure and strategy.
