Probability and Evidence
Probability and Evidence
In this influential study of central issues in the philosophy of science, Paul Horwich elaborates on an important conception of probability, diagnosing the failure of previous attempts to resolve these issues as stemming from a too-rigid conception of belief. Adopting a Bayesian strategy, he argues for a probabilistic approach, yielding a more complete understanding of the characteristics of scientific reasoning and methodology. Presented in a fresh twenty-first-century series livery, and including a specially commissioned preface written by Colin Howson, illuminating its enduring importance and relevance to philosophical enquiry, this engaging work has been revived for a new generation of readers.
- Unique to Cambridge, this classic book has been revived and rebranded for a twenty-first-century readership
- Presents Paul Horwich's probabilistic approach to scientific reasoning and methodology
- Offers resolutions of central issues in the philosophy of science
- Features a specially commissioned preface written by Colin Howson
Reviews & endorsements
'… the strongest and most influential parts of Probability and Evidence are Horwich’s solutions to various puzzles about scientific reasoning … the book might very well still be of considerable interest to those who are looking for an engaging and readable introduction to the topic of scientific reasoning from a Bayesian perspective.' Finnur Dellsén, Metascience
Product details
August 2016Hardback
9781107142107
146 pages
235 × 157 × 12 mm
0.35kg
10 b/w illus. 5 tables
Available
Table of Contents
- Preface to this edition Colin Howson
- Part I. Methodology:
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Aspects of the scientific method
- 3. A taste of Bayesianism
- Part II. Probability:
- 4. The primitive theory
- 5. Subjectivism
- 6. The rationalist interpretation
- 7. The logical interpretation
- 8. The evidential state
- 9. The empirical interpretation
- Part III. Confirmation:
- 10. Explications
- 11. The paradox
- 12. A Bayesian pseudo-solution to the problem of induction
- 13. Projection
- Part IV. Induction: Section 1. The Nature of Inductive Inference
- Section 2. Conditions of Rationality:
- 14. Demonstrable reliability
- 15. The demonstrable reliability of c+
- 16. Immodesty
- 17. Audacity
- Section 3. The Justification of Induction:
- 18. The impossibility of a noncircular rationale
- 19. Inductive demonstration of reliability
- 20. Semantic justification
- Part V. Prediction:
- 21. Surprise
- 22. Severe tests
- 23. Ad hoc hypothesis
- 24. Prediction versus accommodation
- Part VI. Evidence:
- 25. The evidential value of varied data
- 26. The value of further data
- Part VII. Realism:
- 27. Popper
- 28. Realism versus instrumentalism
- 29. Putnam
- 30. Glymour
- 31. Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index.
