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Error and Inference

Error and Inference

Error and Inference

Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science
Deborah G. Mayo, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Aris Spanos, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
No date available
Paperback
9780521180252
Paperback

    Although both philosophers and scientists are interested in how to obtain reliable knowledge in the face of error, there is a gap between their perspectives that has been an obstacle to progress. By means of a series of exchanges between the editors and leaders from the philosophy of science, statistics and economics, this volume offers a cumulative introduction connecting problems of traditional philosophy of science to problems of inference in statistical and empirical modelling practice. Philosophers of science and scientific practitioners are challenged to reevaluate the assumptions of their own theories - philosophical or methodological. Practitioners may better appreciate the foundational issues around which their questions revolve and thereby become better 'applied philosophers'. Conversely, new avenues emerge for finally solving recalcitrant philosophical problems of induction, explanation and theory testing.

    • Bridges the gap between traditional philosophy and contemporary methodology of science studies
    • Uses the bridge to enrich and unify problems of research foundations in philosophy of science
    • Explains and solves recalcitrant problems of foundations of statistics and modelling

    Reviews & endorsements

    'Mayo and Spanos's collection has injected new ideas into the study of scientific inference. This book offers a welcome bridge between current philosophy of science and scientific practice, providing the reader with new insights on important topics such as statistical inference, reliability, theory testing, causal modeling, and the relation between theory and experiment. The book will have a wide and enthusiastic readership among philosophers and scientists.' Cristina Bicchieri, University of Pennsylvania

    'Error and Inference straddles philosophy and practice; its lessons should be taken seriously in both. The editors suppose that venerable philosophical problems surrounding induction, scientific inference, and objectivity can be solved. The essays in the book give support to that perspective. They also show that pressing practical problems of scientific inference and testing gain marked benefit from careful attention to philosophers' accounts of what makes for evidence, rationality, and objectivity.' Nancy Cartwright, London School of Economics

    'The error-probabilistic approach developed by Deborah Mayo and Aris Spanos is the main alternative to Bayesianism in contemporary philosophy of science. In this superb volume Mayo and Spanos face their critics and show that error-probabilism is able to solve most theoretical puzzles of statistical testing. If some issue in the field of inductive inference is bothering you, you will probably find an answer in this book.' Francesco Guala, University of Milan

    'Mayo, an empirically minded philosopher, and Spanos, a philosophically minded economist, have succeeded beautifully in orchestrating a lively debate over methodological issues related to statistics and empirical testing that - unlike too much of the philosophy of science - speaks to the genuine issues that the practitioners of empirical sciences face daily. Their important volume deserves a broad readership.' Kevin Hoover, Duke University

    'Mayo and Spanos continue their campaign to bring confirmation theory face-to-face with the methods of scientists, and now extend it to the history of science and to general theories too. This book begins with a fine introduction to Mayo's error-statistical approach that makes the book a useful teaching tool. But then it carries forward the discussion of this approach with challenging papers from Glymour, Laudan, Achinstein, Worrall, and others.' Alexander Rosenberg, Duke University

    'This is a wonderful volume. It contains original and stimulating essays by leading figures from both philosophy and statistics on notions of evidence and testing; on how these interact with ideas about causation, explanation, and scientific rationality; and much more besides. The volume also features detailed and illuminating exchanges between the contributors. A must-read for anyone with an interest in these topics.' Jim Woodward, California Institute of Technology

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    Product details

    No date available
    Paperback
    9780521180252
    440 pages
    226 × 152 × 28 mm
    0.66kg
    12 b/w illus. 4 tables

    Table of Contents

    • Part I. Introduction and Background:
    • 1. Philosophy of methodological practice Deborah Mayo
    • 2. Error statistical philosophy Deborah Mayo and Aris Spanos
    • Part II:
    • 3. Severe testing, error statistics, and the growth of theoretical knowledge Deborah Mayo
    • Part III:
    • 4. Can scientific theories be warranted? Alan Chalmers
    • 5. Can scientific theories be warranted with severity? Exchanges with Alan Chalmers Deborah Mayo
    • Part IV:
    • 6. Critical rationalism, explanation and severe tests Alan Musgrave
    • 7. Towards progressive critical rationalism: exchanges with Alan Musgrave Deborah Mayo
    • Part V:
    • 8. Error, tests and theory-confirmation John Worrall
    • 9. Has Worrall saved his theory (on ad hoc saves) in a non ad hoc manner? Exchanges with Worrall Deborah Mayo
    • Part VI:
    • 10. Mill's sins, or Mayo's errors? Peter Achinstein
    • 11. Sins of the Bayesian epistemologist: exchanges with Achinstein Deborah Mayo
    • Part VII:
    • 12. Theory testing in economics and the error statistical perspective Aris Spanos
    • Part VIII:
    • 13. Frequentist statistics as a theory of inductive inference Deborah Mayo and David Cox
    • 14. Objectivity and conditionality in Frequentist inference David Cox and Deborah Mayo
    • 15. An error in the argument from WCP and S to the SLP Deborah Mayo
    • 16. On a new philosophy of Frequentist inference: exchanges with Cox and Mayo Aris Spanos
    • Part IX:
    • 17. Explanation and truth Clark Glymour
    • 18. Explanation and testing: exchanges with Glymour Deborah Mayo
    • 19. Graphical causal modeling and error statistics: exchanges with Glymour Aris Spanos
    • Part X:
    • 20. Legal epistemology: the anomaly of affirmative defenses Larry Laudan
    • 21. Error and the law: exchanges with Laudan Deborah Mayo.
      Contributors
    • Deborah Mayo, Aris Spanos, Alan Chalmers, Alan Musgrave, John Worrall, Peter Achinstein, David Cox, Clark Glymour, Larry Laudan