The Dynamics of Norms
The Dynamics of Norms
Richard Jeffrey, Princeton University, New Jersey
Brian Skyrms, University of California, Irvine
$47.00
USDIn the social sciences norms are sometimes taken to play a key explanatory role. Yet norms differ from group to group, from society to society, and from species to species. How are norms formed and how do they change? This 'state-of-the-art' collection of essays presents some of the best contemporary research into the dynamic processes underlying the formation, maintenance, metamorphosis and dissolution of norms. The volume combines formal modelling with more traditional analysis, and considers biological and cultural evolution, individual learning, and rational deliberation. In filling a significant gap in the current literature this volume will be of particular interest to economists, political scientists and sociologists, in addition to philosophers of the social sciences.
- State-of-the-art collection on the dynamics of norms
- Incorporates best contemporary research
- Interdisciplinary interests among philosophy and the social sciences
Product details
April 2009Paperback
9780521108744
236 pages
229 × 152 × 14 mm
0.35kg
16 b/w illus.
Available
Table of Contents
- 1. The evolution of strategies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma Robert Axelrod
- 2. Learning to co-operate Cristina Bicchieri
- 3. On the dynamics of social norms Pier Luigi Sacco
- 4. Learning and efficiency in common interest signalling games David Canning
- 5. Learning on a Torus Luca Anderlini and Antonella Ianni
- 6. Evolutive vs. naive Bayesian learning Immanuel M. Bomze and Jurgen Eichberger
- 7. Learning and mixed strategy equilibria in evolutionary games Vincent P. Crawford
- 8. Bayesian learning in games: a non-Bayesian perspective J. S. Jordan
- 9. Savage-Bayesian agents play a repeated game Yaw Nyarko
- 10. Chaos and the explanatory significance of equilibrium: strange attractors in evolutionary game theory Brian Skyrms.
