Decision Theory as Philosophy
Introducing a new variant on Bayesian decision theory the author offers a compelling case that, while no panacea, decision theory does in fact have the most profound consequences for the way in which philosophers think about inquiry, criticism and rational belief. The new variant on Bayesian theory is presented in such a way that a nonspecialist will be able to understand it. The book also offers new solutions to some classic paradoxes. It focuses on the intuitive motivations of the Bayesian approach to epistemology and addresses the philosophical worries to which it has given rise.
- Introduction to decision theory for broad range of philosophy students
- Technical proofs confined to appendices
Product details
January 1998Paperback
9780521624961
248 pages
228 × 151 × 14 mm
0.345kg
Available
Table of Contents
- 1. Confidence
- 2. Evidence
- 3. The Bayesian challenge
- 4. Rational belief
- 5. The Bayesian Canon
- 6. Decision theory as epistemology.