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Acceptable Premises

Acceptable Premises

Acceptable Premises

An Epistemic Approach to an Informal Logic Problem
James B. Freeman, Hunter College, City University of New York
January 2005
Hardback
9780521833011

    When, if ever, is one justified in accepting the premises of an argument? What is the proper criterion of premise acceptability? Can the criterion be theoretically or philosophically justified? This is the first book to provide a comprehensive theory of premise acceptability and it answers the questions above from an epistemological approach that the author calls common sense foundationalism. It will be eagerly sought out not just by specialists in informal logic, critical thinking, and argumentation theory but also by a broader range of philosophers and those teaching rhetoric.

    • First book to provide a comprehensive theory of premise acceptability
    • Will have crossover appeal in philosophy, rhetoric and communication studies

    Reviews & endorsements

    "..fine book...A particular merit of his foundationalism is its breath....an important contribution to epistemology of ethics... -David Hitchcock, McMaster University, Philosophical Inquiry.

    See more reviews

    Product details

    January 2005
    Hardback
    9780521833011
    416 pages
    236 × 157 × 30 mm
    0.664kg
    Available

    Table of Contents

    • Part I. Acceptability: Dialectical and Epistemological Considerations:
    • 1. Why do we need a theory of acceptability?
    • 2. Acceptability and presumption
    • 3. Factors determining presumption: basic considerations
    • 4. Epistemological considerations: acceptability, deontology, internalism, justification
    • Part II. Statements, Belief-Generating Mechanisms, and Presumptive Reliability:
    • 5. What types of statements are there?
    • 6. Necessary statements and a priori intuition
    • 7. Descriptions and their belief-generating mechanisms
    • 8. Interpretations and their modes of intuition
    • 9. Evaluations and the moral faculties
    • 10. Taking one's word: the interpersonal belief-generating mechanism
    • Part III. Practice and Perspective:
    • 11. An outline of the practice of epistemic causistry
    • 12. Theoretical considerations: a common sense foundationalism.