Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics
This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundation of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalistic world view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational life plan. In striking contrast to many traditional authors and to other recent writers in the field, David Brink offers an integrated defense of the objectivity of ethics.
Reviews & endorsements
'I hope and expect that publication will considerably advance the subject of moral philosophy by leading to a much higher level of discussion of the main issues.' Gilbert Harman, Princeton University
Product details
June 1989Paperback
9780521359375
356 pages
216 × 138 × 22 mm
0.538kg
Available
Table of Contents
- Preface
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Moral realism and moral inquiry
- 3. Externalist moral realism
- 4. Does moral realsim matter?
- 5. A coherentist moral epistemology
- 6. Moral realism and the is/ought thesis
- 7. Posteriori objections to moral realism
- 8. Objective utilitarianism
- Appendices
- Bibliography
- Index.