Integrity and the Virtues of Reason
Integrity and the Virtues of Reason
Many people have claimed that integrity requires sticking to one's convictions come what may. Greg Scherkoske challenges this claim, arguing that it creates problems in distinguishing integrity from fanaticism, close-mindedness or mere inertia. Rather, integrity requires sticking to one's convictions to the extent that they are justifiable and likely to be correct. In contrast to traditional views of integrity, Scherkoske contends that it is an epistemic virtue intimately connected to what we know and have reason to believe, rather than an essentially moral virtue connected to our values. He situates integrity in the context of shared cognitive and practical agency and shows that the relationship between integrity and impartial morality is not as antagonistic as many have thought - which has important implications for the 'integrity objection' to impartial moral theories. This original and provocative study will be of great interest to advanced students and scholars of ethics.
- Situates integrity in the context of epistemic virtues and shared cognitive and practical agency
- Argues that the relationship between integrity and impartial morality is not as antagonistic as many have thought
- Helps to move the important debate surrounding the 'integrity objection' to impartial moral theories in important new directions
Reviews & endorsements
'… contributes significantly to the literature on integrity, with novel, well-argued proposals and extremely clear organization …' S. E. Forschler, Choice
'Scherkoske's book makes a distinctive contribution to the literature on integrity … It will reward close reading by those interested not only in integrity itself, but also in virtue theory more generally, the epistemology of disagreement, the epistemology of testimony, speech act theory and normative ethics. Scherkoske's writing is a model of constructive engagement with his many philosophical interlocutors … his conception of integrity, and of what it takes to lead a 'convincing life' … is deserving of serious consideration.' Andrea C. Westlund, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
'… this book marks an important advance for the literature on integrity. It will serve as essential reading for anyone interested in this elusive virtue and this account will no doubt be one that anyone attempting to defend an alternative view of integrity must respond to. It will also be of interest to anyone working in ethics or epistemology, particularly those seeking to understand the difference between moral and epistemic virtues.' Alfred Archer, Philosophy
Product details
April 2013Hardback
9781107000674
270 pages
236 × 158 × 21 mm
0.55kg
Available
Table of Contents
- 1. Two cheers for integrity?
- 2. Integrity and moral danger
- 3. Might integrity be an intellectual virtue?
- 4. Integrity and self-trust
- 5. Integrity, assurance and responsibility
- 6. Integrity and impartial morality I
- 7. Integrity and impartial morality II
- Postscript: the moral importance of leading a convincing life.
