Properties and Propositions
Properties and Propositions
This book articulates and defends Fregean realism, a theory of properties based on Frege's insight that properties are not objects, but rather the satisfaction conditions of predicates. Robert Trueman argues that this approach is the key not only to dissolving a host of longstanding metaphysical puzzles, such as Bradley's Regress and the Problem of Universals, but also to understanding the relationship between states of affairs, propositions, and the truth conditions of sentences. Fregean realism, Trueman suggests, ultimately leads to a version of the identity theory of truth, the theory that true propositions are identical to obtaining states of affairs. In other words, the identity theory collapses the gap between mind and world. This book will be of interest to anyone working in logic, metaphysics, the philosophy of language or the philosophy of mind.
- Argues for Fregean realism, the thesis that properties are not objects
- Shows that Frege's insights can dissolve a number of longstanding metaphysical puzzles
- Presents the arguments as informally as possible, with a minimum of formal logical notation
Reviews & endorsements
'This is an excellent book. Trueman offers a sophisticated argument for a Fregean conception of higher-order logic, and adeptly applies the resulting view to a number of philosophical questions. I recommend it highly it to anyone interested in issues to do with properties and propositions in philosophical logic, the philosophy of language, and metaphysics.' Michael Rieppel, Syracuse University
'In the last quarter of the twentieth-century, logicians escaped from the Quinean straitjacket which had tried to confine their subject to first-order logic. In the past ten years, a band of younger philosophers has been exploring the consequences of that liberation for metaphysics. One of its leaders, Robert Trueman, has now set out at length his view of those consequences for properties and propositions. The resulting book is consistently engaging and thought-provoking. Throughout its pages we hear an attractive new philosophical voice: forthright, clever, guileless.' Ian Rumfitt, All Souls College, University of Oxford
'This is just the sort of book I like. Trueman enters one of the most notorious of philosophical swamps - Frege's puzzle of the concept horse - and emerges triumphant at the other end, in an outstanding display of clarity, rigor, and philosophical sense. And that's just the beginning. Trueman goes on to generalize his resolution of the puzzle to a satisfying and wide-ranging philosophy of logic; all of this while remaining pleasingly attentive to historical sources and writing wonderful prose. Properties and Propositions is sure to be a standard reference for years to come.' Agustín Rayo, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Product details
January 2021Hardback
9781108840477
240 pages
160 × 235 × 15 mm
0.48kg
Available
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- 1. Substitution in a Sense
- 2. The Term/Predicate Distinction
- 3. Ramsey's Challenge
- 4. Two Types of Reference
- 5. The Reference Principle
- 6. Fregean Realism
- 7. Fregean Nominalism
- 8. Some
- 9. The Concept Horse Paradox
- 10. The Metaphysics Exam
- 11. States of A airs
- 12. The Prenective View of Propositional Content
- 13. On Content and Object
- 14. The Identity Theory of Truth
- References
- Index.
