Debating Self-Knowledge
Language users ordinarily suppose that they know what thoughts their own utterances express. We can call this supposed knowledge minimal self-knowledge. But what does it come to? And do we actually have it? Anti-individualism implies that the thoughts which a person's utterances express are partly determined by facts about their social and physical environments. If anti-individualism is true, then there are some apparently coherent sceptical hypotheses that conflict with our supposition that we have minimal self-knowledge. In this book, Anthony Brueckner and Gary Ebbs debate how to characterize this problem and develop opposing views of what it shows. Their discussion is the only sustained, in-depth debate about anti-individualism, scepticism and knowledge of one's own thoughts, and will interest both scholars and graduate students in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and epistemology.
- Presents a long-running debate between two philosophers, showing how in disagreeing they push each other to clarify and test their views and, in the process, make new discoveries
- Brings together ten previously published papers and includes a co-authored introduction and three substantive new essays
- Will appeal to those who seek to understand how issues about compatibility between self-knowledge and anti-individualism are related to other issues in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and epistemology
Reviews & endorsements
'The Brueckner and Ebbs debate, about whether attitude anti-individualism threatens a subject's authority regarding her own thoughts, is a pleasure to read. This book is a must-read for all who followed the debate over the last decade, and the arguments presented here will also invigorate the debate going forward.' Sanford Goldberg, Northwestern University
'I strongly recommend Brueckner and Ebbs's book to anyone interested in self-knowledge. It is a valuable contribution both in its overall argument and in its specific discussions.' George Lăzăroiu, Review of Contemporary Philosophy
Product details
June 2012Hardback
9781107017139
244 pages
235 × 157 × 16 mm
0.53kg
Available
Table of Contents
- Introduction
- 1. Brains in a vat Anthony Brueckner
- 2. Scepticism, objectivity, and brains in vats Gary Ebbs
- 3. Ebbs on scepticism, objectivity, and brains in vats Anthony Brueckner
- 4. The dialectical context of Putnam's argument that we are not brains in vats Gary Ebbs
- 5. Trying to get outside your own skin Anthony Brueckner
- 6. Can we take our words at face value? Gary Ebbs
- 7. Is scepticism about self-knowledge incoherent? Anthony Brueckner
- 8. Is scepticism about self-knowledge coherent? Gary Ebbs
- 9. The coherence of scepticism about self-knowledge Anthony Brueckner
- 10. Why scepticism about self-knowledge is self-undermining Gary Ebbs
- 11. Scepticism about self-knowledge redux Anthony Brueckner
- 12. Self-knowledge in doubt Gary Ebbs
- 13. Looking back Anthony Brueckner
- Bibliography
- Index.