Intellectual History and the Problem of Conceptual Change
Intellectual History and the Problem of Conceptual Change
How does long-term intellectual change occur? Can we develop a theoretical framework for understanding past systems of knowledge? In this ambitious study, ElÃas José Palti seeks to reassess the main concepts in the field of intellectual history. Evaluating modes of thought from the seventeenth century to the present, this book aims to prevent an anachronistic understanding of the texts of the past. Palti rejects the idea of conceptual change as a coherent process deriving from one single source. Instead, he offers a convincing explanation of converging developments emanating from three different sources: namely, the Cambridge school, the German school of conceptual history, or Begriffsgeschichte, and French politico-conceptual history. Intellectual History and the Problem of Conceptual Change also closely examines the temporality of concepts, questioning how and why political languages mutate.
- Provides a new framework for conceptualising long-term intellectual change
- Reassesses major theories in the field of Intellectual History
- Examines modes of thought from the 17th century to the present
Product details
May 2024Hardback
9781009461191
298 pages
222 × 145 × 21 mm
0.5kg
Available
Table of Contents
- Introduction: From the 'history of ideas' to the 'new intellectual history,' and beyond
- 1. Pocock, Skinner and the 'historiographical revolution'
- 2. The Republican genealogy and the normative temptation
- 3. The problem of conceptual change
- 4. Conceptual history: its philosophical foundations
- 5. Koselleck's Begriffsgechichte: between social and conceptual history
- 6. Hans Blumenberg and the theory of nonconceptuality
- 7. From structuralism to poststructuralism: Pierre Rosanvallon and the 'conceptual history of the political'
- 8. Foucault's archaeology of knowledge
- 9. The archaeological project and the ignored epistemic mutation
- 10. Behind the structures and the subject: the 'event'
- Conclusion: the 'new intellectual history' and the dynamics of de-substantialization of concepts.
