Our systems are now restored following recent technical disruption, and we’re working hard to catch up on publishing. We apologise for the inconvenience caused. Find out more

Recommended product

Popular links

Popular links


Strategic Foundations of General Equilibrium

Strategic Foundations of General Equilibrium

Strategic Foundations of General Equilibrium

Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Games
Douglas Gale, New York University
September 2000
Hardback
9780521643306

    The theory of competition has held a central place in economic analysis since Adam Smith. This book, written by one of the most distinguished of contemporary economic theorists, reports on a major research program to provide strategic foundations for the theory of perfect competition. Beginning with a concise survey of how the theory of competition has evolved, Gale makes extensive and rigorous use of dynamic matching and bargaining models to provide a more complete description of how a competitive equlibrium is achieved. Whereas economists have made use of a macroscopic description of markets in which certain behavioral characteristics, such as price-taking behavior, are taken for granted, Gale uses game theory to re-evaluate this assumption, beginning with individual agents and modelling their strategic interaction. A strategic foundation for competitive equilibrium shows how such interaction leads to competitive, price-taking behavior. Essential reading for graduate courses in game theory and general equilibrium.

    • Written by leading economic theorist
    • Introduces reader to leading edge research in central area of economic theory
    • Provides foundations for new theory of general competitive equilibrium

    Product details

    September 2000
    Hardback
    9780521643306
    232 pages
    216 × 140 × 18 mm
    0.45kg
    Available

    Table of Contents

    • 1. Markets and games
    • 2. Perfect competition
    • 3. Continuity and anonymity
    • 4. Bounded rationality
    • 5. Afterthoughts.
      Author
    • Douglas Gale , New York University