From Decision Theory to Game Theory
From Decision Theory to Game Theory
£49.99
GBPFrom Decision Theory to Game Theory shows how the reasoning patterns of common belief in rationality, correct beliefs and symmetric beliefs can be defined in a unified way. It explores the link between decision theory and game theory, particularly how various important classes of games (e.g., games with incomplete information, games with unawareness and psychological games), can be analysed from both a unified decision-theoretic and unified interactive-reasoning perspective. Providing a smooth transition between one-person decision theory and game theory, it views each game as a collection of one-person decision problems – one for every player. Written in a non-technical style, this book includes practical problems and examples from everyday life to make the material more accessible. The book is targeted at a wide audience, including students and scholars from economics, mathematics, business, philosophy, logic, computer science, artificial intelligence, sociology and political science.
- Explains the many connections between three classes of games, allowing readers to analyze them in a uniform fashion
- Provides a smooth transition from one-person decision theory to game theory
- Provides in-chapter questions, and exercises to better help the reader understand the material
Reviews & endorsements
'The book is engaging, well-structured, and well-written by a leading scholar in the field. It presents the key concepts in an exceptionally clear and simple way, making them accessible to readers with a minimal background in mathematics. I recommend the book for researchers and students who want to learn the epistemic foundations of game theory.' Xiao Luo, National University of Singapore
'This is a thorough, comprehensive text, that treats decision making in a unified way for three classes of games: games with incomplete information, games with unawareness, and psychological games. The unified treatment makes it possible to bring out similarities and highlight differences. Perea brings the reader to the forefront of current research in an engaging way, with many illustrative examples.' Joe Halpern, Cornell University
Product details
July 2025Paperback
9781009522830
606 pages
244 × 170 mm
Not yet published - available from July 2025
Table of Contents
- 1. Introduction
- Part I. Decision Problems:
- 2. Decision Problems
- Part II. Standard Games:
- 3. Common Belief in Rationality in Standard Games
- 4. Correct and Symmetric Beliefs in Standard Games
- Part III. Incomplete Information:
- 5. Common Belief in Rationality with Incomplete Information
- 6. Correct and Symmetric Beliefs with Incomplete Information
- Part IV. Unawareness: Common 7. In Rationality with Unawareness
- Part V. Psychological Games:
- 8. Common Belief in Rationality in Psychological Games
- 9. Correct and Symmetric Beliefs in Psychological Games.
