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Advances in Economic Theory

Advances in Economic Theory

Advances in Economic Theory

Sixth World Congress
Volume 1:
Jean-Jacques Laffont, Université de Toulouse I (Sciences Sociales)
March 1995
1
Paperback
9780521484596
£35.00
GBP
Paperback

    This book comprises the first volume of papers presented at the Sixth World congress of the Econometric Society in Barcelona in August 1990. With papers from the world's leading specialists, it gives the reader a unique survey of advances in economic theory.

    • Essential reading for anyone interested in economic theory
    • Superb introduction to the field for graduates and other non-specialists
    • Papers from leading specialists in the field from all over the world

    Reviews & endorsements

    '[This book] is essential reading for anyone who is interested in the present state of economic theory and its likely future direction. Between them the papers cover almost all the areas of economic theory which were most active in the latter part of the 1980s (all of them still highly active today). All the papers are lucid and well presented … and in some cases … will remain for some time to come the best introduction to the subject for graduate students and other non-specialists.' Robert Evans, The Economic Journal

    See more reviews

    Product details

    March 1995
    Paperback
    9780521484596
    340 pages
    227 × 151 × 19 mm
    0.478kg
    37 b/w illus.
    Available

    Table of Contents

    • List of contributors
    • Editor's preface
    • 1. Foundations of game theory Kenneth J. Binmore
    • 2. Refinements of Nash equilibrium Eric van Damme
    • Discussion of 'Foundations of game theory', Kenneth G. Binmore and 'Refinements of Nash equilibrium,' Eric van Damme Eddie Dekel
    • 3. Explaining cooperation and commitment in repeated games Drew Fudenberg
    • 4. Repeated games: cooperation and rationality David G. Pearce
    • Comments on the interpretation of repeated games theory Ariel Rubinstein
    • 5. Implementation, contracts and renegotiation in environments with complete information John Moore
    • 6. Implementation in Bayesian equilibrium: the multiple equilibrium problem in mechanism design Thomas R. Palfrey
    • Implementation theory: discussion Mathias Dewatripont.
      Contributors
    • Kenneth J. Binmore, Eric van Damme, Eddie Dekel, Drew Fudenberg, David G. Pearce, Ariel Rubinstein, John Moore, Thomas R. Palfrey, Mathais Dewatripont

    • Editor
    • Jean-Jacques Laffont , Université de Toulouse I (Sciences Sociales)