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Theory of Conditional Games

Theory of Conditional Games

Theory of Conditional Games

Wynn C. Stirling, Brigham Young University, Utah
March 2012
Hardback
9781107011748

    Game theory explains how to make good choices when different decision makers have conflicting interests. The classical approach assumes that decision makers are committed to making the best choices for themselves regardless of the effect on others, but such an approach is less appropriate when cooperation, compromise and negotiation are important. This book describes conditional games, a form of game theory that accommodates multiple stakeholder decision-making scenarios where cooperation and negotiation are significant issues and where notions of concordant group behavior are important. Using classical binary preference relations as a point of departure, the book extends the concept of a preference ordering that permits stakeholders to modulate their preferences as functions of the preferences of others. As these conditional preferences propagate through a group of decision makers, they create social bonds that lead to notions of group concordance. This book is intended for all students and researchers of decision theory and game theory.

    • Revises game theory to accommodate multiple stakeholder decision-making scenarios
    • Extends the concept of a preference ordering to permit stakeholders to modulate their preferences as functions of the preferences of others

    Reviews & endorsements

    '… in my opinion Stirling's book is the most important new basis for novel extensions and applications of game theory since the invention of stochastic equilibrium ideas two decades ago.' Journal of Economic Methodology

    See more reviews

    Product details

    March 2012
    Hardback
    9781107011748
    250 pages
    233 × 158 × 22 mm
    0.53kg
    27 b/w illus. 29 tables
    Available

    Table of Contents

    • 1. Sociality
    • 2. Conditioning
    • 3. Solutions
    • 4. Coordination
    • 5. Uncertainty
    • 6. Satisficing
    • 7. Applications
    • 8. Conclusion.